Privileging Industry : The Comparative Politics of Trade and Industrial Policy /
McGillivray, Fiona
Privileging Industry : The Comparative Politics of Trade and Industrial Policy / Fiona McGillivray. - 1 online resource
Frontmatter -- Contents -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- Acknowledgments -- CHAPTER 1. Redistributive Politics -- CHAPTER 2. Who Are the Decision Makers and What Motivates Them? -- CHAPTER 3. Party Strength as a Determinant of Industry Tariffs -- CHAPTER 4. Restructuring and Redistribution in the Steel Industry -- CHAPTER 5. Redistributive Politics and Industry Stock Prices -- CHAPTER 6. A Theory and Direction for Future Research -- Notes -- References -- Index
restricted access http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec
Why do some industries win substantial protection from the whims of international trade while others do not? Privileging Industry challenges standard approaches to this question in its examination of when governments use trade and industrial policy for political goals. Fiona McGillivray shows why aiding an industry can be a politically efficient way for a government to redistribute resources from one industrial sector to another. Taking a comparative perspective that stands in contrast with the usual focus on U.S. trade politics, she explores, for example, how electoral rules, party strength, and industrial geography affect redistribution politics across countries. How do political institutions and the geographical dispersion of industries interact to determine which industries governments privilege? What tests can assess how governments distribute assistance across industries? Research has focused on the industries that legislators want to protect, but just as important is identifying those legislators able to deliver trade assistance. Assisting an industry requires both a will and a means. Whether an industry is a good vehicle through which to redistribute income depends on its geographic make-up and the country's electoral system. In turn, the electoral system and party strength affect how legislators' preferences contribute to policy. McGillivray tests these arguments using a tariff-based empirical test and nonstandard dependent variables such as the dispersion of stock prices within fourteen different capital markets, and government influence in the targeting of plant closures within declining industries.
Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.
In English.
9780691190358
10.1515/9780691190358 doi
Commercial policy.
Industrial policy.
POLITICAL SCIENCE / Comparative Politics.
338
Privileging Industry : The Comparative Politics of Trade and Industrial Policy / Fiona McGillivray. - 1 online resource
Frontmatter -- Contents -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- Acknowledgments -- CHAPTER 1. Redistributive Politics -- CHAPTER 2. Who Are the Decision Makers and What Motivates Them? -- CHAPTER 3. Party Strength as a Determinant of Industry Tariffs -- CHAPTER 4. Restructuring and Redistribution in the Steel Industry -- CHAPTER 5. Redistributive Politics and Industry Stock Prices -- CHAPTER 6. A Theory and Direction for Future Research -- Notes -- References -- Index
restricted access http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec
Why do some industries win substantial protection from the whims of international trade while others do not? Privileging Industry challenges standard approaches to this question in its examination of when governments use trade and industrial policy for political goals. Fiona McGillivray shows why aiding an industry can be a politically efficient way for a government to redistribute resources from one industrial sector to another. Taking a comparative perspective that stands in contrast with the usual focus on U.S. trade politics, she explores, for example, how electoral rules, party strength, and industrial geography affect redistribution politics across countries. How do political institutions and the geographical dispersion of industries interact to determine which industries governments privilege? What tests can assess how governments distribute assistance across industries? Research has focused on the industries that legislators want to protect, but just as important is identifying those legislators able to deliver trade assistance. Assisting an industry requires both a will and a means. Whether an industry is a good vehicle through which to redistribute income depends on its geographic make-up and the country's electoral system. In turn, the electoral system and party strength affect how legislators' preferences contribute to policy. McGillivray tests these arguments using a tariff-based empirical test and nonstandard dependent variables such as the dispersion of stock prices within fourteen different capital markets, and government influence in the targeting of plant closures within declining industries.
Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.
In English.
9780691190358
10.1515/9780691190358 doi
Commercial policy.
Industrial policy.
POLITICAL SCIENCE / Comparative Politics.
338