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Privileging Industry : The Comparative Politics of Trade and Industrial Policy / Fiona McGillivray.

By: Material type: TextTextPublisher: Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press, [2018]Copyright date: ©2004Description: 1 online resourceContent type:
Media type:
Carrier type:
ISBN:
  • 9780691190358
Subject(s): DDC classification:
  • 338 23
Other classification:
  • online - DeGruyter
Online resources:
Contents:
Frontmatter -- Contents -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- Acknowledgments -- CHAPTER 1. Redistributive Politics -- CHAPTER 2. Who Are the Decision Makers and What Motivates Them? -- CHAPTER 3. Party Strength as a Determinant of Industry Tariffs -- CHAPTER 4. Restructuring and Redistribution in the Steel Industry -- CHAPTER 5. Redistributive Politics and Industry Stock Prices -- CHAPTER 6. A Theory and Direction for Future Research -- Notes -- References -- Index
Summary: Why do some industries win substantial protection from the whims of international trade while others do not? Privileging Industry challenges standard approaches to this question in its examination of when governments use trade and industrial policy for political goals. Fiona McGillivray shows why aiding an industry can be a politically efficient way for a government to redistribute resources from one industrial sector to another. Taking a comparative perspective that stands in contrast with the usual focus on U.S. trade politics, she explores, for example, how electoral rules, party strength, and industrial geography affect redistribution politics across countries. How do political institutions and the geographical dispersion of industries interact to determine which industries governments privilege? What tests can assess how governments distribute assistance across industries? Research has focused on the industries that legislators want to protect, but just as important is identifying those legislators able to deliver trade assistance. Assisting an industry requires both a will and a means. Whether an industry is a good vehicle through which to redistribute income depends on its geographic make-up and the country's electoral system. In turn, the electoral system and party strength affect how legislators' preferences contribute to policy. McGillivray tests these arguments using a tariff-based empirical test and nonstandard dependent variables such as the dispersion of stock prices within fourteen different capital markets, and government influence in the targeting of plant closures within declining industries.
Holdings
Item type Current library Call number URL Status Notes Barcode
eBook eBook Biblioteca "Angelicum" Pont. Univ. S.Tommaso d'Aquino Nuvola online online - DeGruyter (Browse shelf(Opens below)) Online access Not for loan (Accesso limitato) Accesso per gli utenti autorizzati / Access for authorized users (dgr)9780691190358

Frontmatter -- Contents -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- Acknowledgments -- CHAPTER 1. Redistributive Politics -- CHAPTER 2. Who Are the Decision Makers and What Motivates Them? -- CHAPTER 3. Party Strength as a Determinant of Industry Tariffs -- CHAPTER 4. Restructuring and Redistribution in the Steel Industry -- CHAPTER 5. Redistributive Politics and Industry Stock Prices -- CHAPTER 6. A Theory and Direction for Future Research -- Notes -- References -- Index

restricted access online access with authorization star

http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec

Why do some industries win substantial protection from the whims of international trade while others do not? Privileging Industry challenges standard approaches to this question in its examination of when governments use trade and industrial policy for political goals. Fiona McGillivray shows why aiding an industry can be a politically efficient way for a government to redistribute resources from one industrial sector to another. Taking a comparative perspective that stands in contrast with the usual focus on U.S. trade politics, she explores, for example, how electoral rules, party strength, and industrial geography affect redistribution politics across countries. How do political institutions and the geographical dispersion of industries interact to determine which industries governments privilege? What tests can assess how governments distribute assistance across industries? Research has focused on the industries that legislators want to protect, but just as important is identifying those legislators able to deliver trade assistance. Assisting an industry requires both a will and a means. Whether an industry is a good vehicle through which to redistribute income depends on its geographic make-up and the country's electoral system. In turn, the electoral system and party strength affect how legislators' preferences contribute to policy. McGillivray tests these arguments using a tariff-based empirical test and nonstandard dependent variables such as the dispersion of stock prices within fourteen different capital markets, and government influence in the targeting of plant closures within declining industries.

Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.

In English.

Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 30. Aug 2021)